Intervention du Commandant de Al'FRICOM le Géneral Ham devant le Congrès Américain.

Intervention du Commandant  de Al'FRICOM le Géneral Ham devant le Congrès Américain.



UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
15 MARCH 2013
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
STATEMENT OF GENERAL
CARTER HAM, USA
COMMANDER
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Mission Statement
United States Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the
United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional
organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat
transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and
development.
INTRODUCTION
This year marks the fifth anniversary of the formation of the command. Since our
standup in 2008, our operational capabilities and capacities have markedly increased. In
parallel, our relationships with African partners and our security cooperation engagements
have matured in both focus and effectiveness. Our integrated approach seeks to address the
greatest near-term threats to our national security while simultaneously building long-term
partnerships and fostering regional cooperation.
The past year has witnessed both positive developments and sobering reminders of the
threats in the U.S. Africa Command Area of Responsibility. Many African partners are more
capable of addressing national and regional security challenges today than they were a year
ago, and we have strengthened both new and enduring partnerships. In Somalia, sustained
operations by African forces, with enabling assistance from the United States and the
international community, significantly weakened al-Shabaab, providing space for Somalia’s
transition to a constitutionally based government. We are deepening our relationship with the
Tanzanian military, a professional force whose capabilities and influence increasingly bear on
regional security issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes region. Senegal
and Ghana, anchors of regional stability in West Africa, held peaceful, democratic elections
last year and remain important U.S. partners in efforts to counter transnational threats.
Similarly, in Botswana, a highly capable partner and positive influence throughout southern
Africa, we are strengthening an enduring partnership grounded in shared commitments to
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democracy and the rule of law. Liberia is progressing toward the establishment of a
professional, capable military that is a force for good, as demonstrated by its border
deployment in response to Cote d’ Ivoirian rebel activities last fall. In Libya, a nation that
witnessed its first election of the General National Congress since the overthrow of Qadhafi,
we are developing a strong partnership with the new military.
Despite these positive trends, the regional security environment continues to challenge
U.S. interests and increase the operational demands on U.S. Africa Command. In the past
year, the United States lost four Americans in deadly attacks in Benghazi and three more in
the terrorist attack on a British Petroleum facility in Algeria; al-Qa’ida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) emerged stronger and better armed following the coup d’état in Mali; and
Boko Haram continued its campaign of violence in Nigeria.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Emerging Terrorist Networks
As al-Qa’ida has syndicated its ideology and violence, its affiliates and adherents in
Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have become increasingly networked and adaptable in their
recruiting, training, financing, and operations. Violent extremist organizations, insurgents,
and criminal organizations are exploiting weak governance and under-governed spaces, and
remain determined to harm the United States, our partners and Allies, and innocent civilians.
The need to put pressure on al-Qa'ida affiliates and adherents in East, North, and West Africa
has never been greater. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound
and Annex in Benghazi and the January 2013 attack on the British Petroleum oil facility in
Algeria illustrate the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in Africa to U.S.
citizens and interests. This network of al-Qa’ida affiliates has already developed into a threat
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to U.S. regional interests and if left unchecked, could pose a threat to Europe and the U.S.
Homeland. Coordinated approaches that integrate diplomatic, development, and military
efforts are needed to achieve both short- and long-term counter-terrorism objectives,
including the disruption of terrorist financing and undermining of recruitment efforts by
violent extremist organizations.
Arab Awakening
The Arab Awakening redefined the North African political landscape and continues to
impact countries across the region. Two years ago, the actions of a single Tunisian citizen
catalyzed a wave of change that continues to reverberate throughout North Africa and the
Middle East. The post-revolutionary transitions currently underway in Tunisia and Libya are
extraordinarily important to the future of these countries and to the region and have had
significant consequences for regional security. The flow of fighters and weapons from Libya
to violent extremist organizations in northern Mali serves as one example of how political
instability in one nation can have a profound effect across a broad region. The United States
has a stake in the success of these transitions, not least of all for their potential to serve as a
powerful repudiation of al-Qa’ida’s false narrative that only violent extremism can drive
change. U.S. Africa Command’s relationships with the Tunisian and Libyan militaries have
important roles in supporting these transitions as new governments in Tunisia and Libya work
to develop accountable and effective institutions, strengthen civil society, and improve
security.
Increased Regional and International Integration
The rising political and economic influence of emerging powers is transforming the
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international system, and this change is evident in Africa. Asian economic expansion is
inflating global commodities prices, a major driver of strong economic growth in some African
nations. Increased Chinese engagement in pursuit of economic development is deepening
China’s political and economic influence and increasing its access in the region. Other rapidly
growing economies, including Brazil and India, are similarly increasing their engagement and
investment in Africa. As Africa becomes more fully integrated into the global economy,
African maritime security is growing in importance to the free flow of global commerce. In
parallel with Africa’s continuing integration into global political and economic systems,
African nations are strengthening their regional economic and political integration. African
nations and regional organizations are increasingly taking a lead role in multilateral responses
to regional security threats, both within and outside the structure of the African Union and the
regional standby forces that comprise its continental security architecture.
COMMAND APPROACH
U.S. Africa Command’s approach reflects strategic guidance provided in the
National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategic Guidance, the National Military Strategy,
the Presidential Policy Directive for Political and Economic Reform in the Middle East and
North Africa (PPD 13) and the United States Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Based
on this strategic guidance, U.S. Africa Command protects and advances vital U.S. national
security interests in Africa, including protecting the security of the global economic system,
preventing catastrophic attacks on the homeland, developing secure and reliable partners,
protecting American citizens abroad, and protecting and advancing universal values. These
universal values include the respect for and protection of human rights, the prevention of
mass atrocities, and the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In Africa,
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military-to-military engagement plays a limited but important role in sustaining progress in
countries undergoing democratic transitions, as well as those emerging from conflict.
In support of advancing regional peace and security, U.S. Africa Command focuses
on priority countries, regional organizations, and programs and initiatives that build defense
institutional and operational capabilities and strengthen strategic partnerships. Cooperative
security arrangements are key to addressing transnational threats, and U.S. Africa Command
utilizes operations, exercises, and security cooperation engagements to foster multilateral
cooperation and build the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations. U.S.
assistance, including focused military support, has contributed to significant progress by
African forces in the past year in both peacekeeping and combat operations.
U.S. Africa Command’s strategic approach addresses both threats and opportunities.
We simultaneously address the greatest near-term threats to our national security while
building long-term partnerships that support and enable the objectives outlined in the U.S.
Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa: strengthening democratic institutions; spurring
economic growth, advancing trade and investment; advancing peace and security; and
promoting opportunity and development. Countering terrorism is the Department of
Defense’s (DoD) highest priority mission in Africa and will remain so for the foreseeable
future. While prioritizing addressing emerging security challenges through both direct and
indirect responses, U.S. Africa Command views these challenges also as opportunities to
deepen enduring relationships, strengthen partner capabilities, and foster regional cooperation.
Our theater strategy and four subordinate regional campaign plans guide our
operations, exercises and engagements, which focus on five functional areas: countering
violent extremist organizations; strengthening maritime security and countering illicit
trafficking; strengthening defense capabilities; maintaining strategic posture; and preparing
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for and responding to crises. These activities are primarily executed by U.S. Africa
Command’s components: Army Forces Africa, Air Forces Africa, Naval Forces Africa,
Marine Forces Africa, Special Operations Command Africa, and Combined Joint Task Force-
Horn of Africa. Our headquarters interagency representatives from nine Federal agencies and
liaison officers from eight countries are integral to the success of U.S. Africa Command’s
efforts.
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND PRIORITIES
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS
The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound and Annex
in Benghazi and the January 2013 attack on the British Petroleum oil facility in Algeria
are evidence of the growing threat posed to Americans and U.S. interests by African
violent extremist organizations (VEO) and the global VEO network. In the past year,
U.S. Africa Command worked closely with regional and interagency partners to
strengthen counter-terrorism partnerships grounded in shared security interests, assisted
partner military forces and U.S. interagency partners in discrediting and defeating the
appeal of violent extremism, and strengthened partner capabilities to provide security as
an element of responsive governance.
Three violent extremist organizations are of particular concern in Africa: al-Qa’ida in
the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), active in northern and western Africa; Boko
Haram in Nigeria; and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Although each organization individually poses
a threat to U.S. interests and regional stability, the growing collaboration of these
organizations heightens the danger they collectively represent. Of the three organizations,
AQIM, which exploited the instability that followed the coup d’état in Mali and seeks to
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establish an Islamic state in northern Mali, is currently the most likely to directly threaten U.S.
national security interests in the near- term.
To counter AQIM and support the restoration of governance in Mali, U.S. Africa
Command is providing support to French and African military operations in northern Mali,
which are achieving gains against AQIM and other terrorist organizations. We are
supporting French efforts with information, airlift, and refueling, and are working with the
Department of State (DoS) to support the deployment of west African forces to the Africanled
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Recently, we began unarmed,
remotely piloted aircraft operations from Niger in support of intelligence gathering efforts in
the region. Although French, Malian, and AFISMA forces are achieving success in
removing AQIM fighters from population centers, eliminating the long-term threat posed by
AQIM will require the restoration of Malian governance and territorial integrity, political
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reconciliation with northern indigenous groups, the establishment of security, and the
sustained engagement of the international community.
While international focus is currently on Mali, AQIM is not solely a Malian challenge.
The organization is spread across the Sahel region and requires a regional approach to effectively
address the threat. U.S. Africa Command continues to work closely with the Department of
State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to support regional
counter-terrorism efforts under the umbrella of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
(TSCTP). A partnership between 10 northern and western African nations and the United States,
TSCTP is designed to support the development of partner nation military counter-terrorism skills
and capabilities and foster regional cooperation among participating nations to address the
evolving threat of AQIM and related extremist groups. One aspect of TSCTP’s impact can be
seen in the troop contributions of five participating countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger,
Nigeria, and Senegal) to AFISMA. Although Mali has historically been a TSCTP partner, U.S.
Africa Command is not currently engaged in capacity-building with the armed forces of Mali,
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consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the provision of security assistance to any military
force that has been involved in a military overthrow of a democratically elected government.
In Nigeria, where Boko Haram is conducting a destabilizing campaign of violent
attacks focused on the northern part of the country, U.S. Africa Command engages with the
Nigerian Armed Forces to improve their military capabilities. We seek to support the
development of a professional military that will support a coordinated Nigerian Government
effort to address Boko Haram and provide the citizens of Nigeria with responsive governance
and improved economic opportunity. Boko Haram is in contact with al-Qa’ida and recently
kidnapped a French family in retaliation for French actions against AQIM in Mali. If pressure
on Boko Haram decreases, they could expand their capabilities and reach to pose a more
significant threat to U.S. interests.
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In Somalia, al-Shabaab has been greatly weakened by the operations of African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopian, and Somali forces. While al-Shabaab is less
effective, the group is still dangerous and capable of conducting unconventional attacks to
disrupt AMISOM operations and the newly formed Somali government.
The significant gains achieved by AMISOM forces over the past year were critical in
providing space for the political process that resulted in Somalia’s transition to a government
now formally recognized by the United States. While Somalia faces many challenges ahead,
it is on a positive path. As military-to-military relations are normalized with Somalia, U.S.
Africa Command will work with the DoS to develop security cooperation activities to assist
with the development of a unified Somali security force. For the foreseeable future, focus
must be maintained on Somalia to sustain security progress made to date.
Overall, we believe that our efforts to counter violent extremist organizations are
having a positive impact. Our African partners are demonstrating strengthened capabilities
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and are increasingly cooperating with other nations to address shared security challenges,
including supporting African Union and United Nations operations and programs. The
leadership of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in
addressing the security challenges in Mali is indicative of the growing willingness and
capability of Africans to address African security challenges.
MARITIME SECURITY AND COUNTER ILLICIT TRAFFICKING
Multilateral cooperation in addressing regional maritime security challenges continued
to improve over the past year. Maritime security is not only vital to countering terrorism and
illicit trafficking, but is also a critical enabler of trade and economic development. Coastal
nations contend with a range of challenges off their coasts including trafficking in narcotics
and arms, human trafficking; piracy and armed robbery at sea; oil bunkering; and illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). Piracy and armed robbery at sea in the western
Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea elevated insurance rates and shipping costs, resulting in
increased costs to consumers. IUU fishing devastates African fisheries, which play a vital role
in African economic growth and food security. Criminal organizations leverage ungoverned
maritime space that could also be exploited by violent extremist organizations.
African partners are making progress in addressing challenges in the maritime domain
through cooperative regional approaches supported by the international community. U.S.
Africa Command and our Naval and Marine components work closely with the U.S. Coast
Guard in the execution of our two primary maritime security programs, the African
Partnership Station program (APS) and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership
(AMLEP), which are contributing to strengthening regional maritime capabilities and
interoperability. African maritime forces used skills gained through participation in AMLEP
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and APS to conduct operations that resulted in the seizure of over $100 million worth of
cocaine and the levying of over $3 million in fines. Benin and Nigeria now conduct joint
maritime patrols while South Africa, Tanzania, and Mozambique signed a counter-piracy
agreement codifying their efforts and reflective of the trend of increasing regional cooperation
in addressing maritime security challenges.
Countering illicit trafficking is linked to the challenge of increasing African maritime
security. Illicit trafficking in the maritime, air, and land domains provides income to
international criminal networks, has a destabilizing influence on governance, and is
increasingly exploited by violent extremist organizations as a source of financing. U.S. Africa
Command coordinates closely with U.S. government agencies and embassy law enforcement
teams to conduct programs to counter illicit trafficking. Our efforts focus on increasing
partner nation capacities to detect and interdict illicit trafficking throughout the African
continent. Counter- trafficking skills are applicable to combating a wide range of criminal
activity, including poaching.
As part of our enduring partnership with Liberia, we are supporting the development
of the Liberian Coast Guard and recently renovated the coast guard’s pier to enable
operations. U.S. Africa Command constructed a new Senegalese maritime operation center
with follow on training and assistance to the new center’s staff and advanced training to the
Cape Verde Counter Narcotics and Maritime Operations Center. The U.S. Africa Command
also assisted Cape Verde and Senegal in developing maritime operations centers that have
facilitated the interdiction of suspect vessels.
STRENGTHENING DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
Strengthening partner defense capabilities enables African nations to provide for
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their own security and helps U.S. Africa Command to develop enduring relationships that
support freedom of movement and assured access for U.S. forces. We assist African
nations in developing capable, accountable, self-sustaining military forces and defense
institutions. Our capacity-building activities complement DoS programs and are planned
in close coordination with embassy country teams and partner nations. Our engagements,
which span the range of essential military capabilities, include combined humanitarian and
medical assistance programs conducted in coordination with the USAID.
The success of AMISOM forces against al-Shabaab illustrates the positive impact of
U.S. defense capacity-building efforts in the region. AMISOM forces receive pre-deployment
training through the DoS Global Peace Operations Initiative’s Africa Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. U.S. forces support and complement ACOTA
activities with specialized training in skills that have played a critical role in enhancing the
operational success of AMISOM forces, including intelligence analysis and countering
improvised explosive devices. To date, the forces of five AMISOM troop contributing
countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda) were trained through the
ACOTA program.
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Advice and assistance from U.S. forces enhanced the capabilities and cooperation of
military forces of Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of
the Congo currently engaged in operations to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
Operational gains made by regional forces over the past year, combined with civilian efforts,
resulted in increased LRA defections, the capture of key LRA leaders, and decreased LRA
attacks on civilian populations. The formation of an African Union Regional Task Force will
facilitate further cooperation among counter-LRA forces.
U.S. Africa Command is broadly supporting U.S. commitments to countries
undergoing democratic transitions by assisting in the development of professional militaries
that respect civilian authority, are respectful of the rule of law, and are increasingly capable of
securing their borders and combating mutual threats, including transnational terrorism. We
continue to develop our and strengthen partnerships with the armed forces of Libya and South
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Sudan. In South Sudan we have developed a comprehensive program that supports the
ongoing DoS security assistance program. Our current focus is on education of key
institutional-level personnel and small-scale civil action projects with the South Sudanese
military. Our engagement with the Libyan Armed Forces similarly focuses on education and
also emphasizes the strengthening of Libyan counter- terrorism capabilities. As these
relationships continue to develop, we look forward to deepening our partnership with both
militaries.
U.S. Africa Command’s engagements with African land forces will be enhanced as
the command becomes the first combatant command to be supported by a brigade through
the Army’s Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept. Beginning in March 2013, 2nd
Brigade, 1st Infantry Division will support U.S. Africa Command in developing enduring
relationships and cooperation with partner nation land forces. RAF engagements will likely
range from small travelling contact teams to support to major exercises. Initial planning for
the RAF includes support to State Department-led ACOTA training for African forces
deploying in support of United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations.
An area of emerging focus is strengthening partner defense capabilities in air security
and safety. Last year, our dual-hatted Air Force component, USAFE-AFAFRICA, launched
the African Partnership Flight (APF) program, which promotes regional cooperation and
strengthens the capabilities of partner nation air forces to provide airlift support to United
Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations. 150 airmen from five African nations
participated in APF’s initial event last year, which addressed air mobility and logistics for
peacekeeping operations, priority areas in which African air forces have very limited
capabilities. APF will expand this year to include 175 students from eight nations.
The State Partnership Program (SPP) provides unique capabilities that augment our
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ability to build enduring relationships with strategic partners in the region. SPP
engagements build mutual U.S. and partner nation capacity to address shared security
challenges. SPP activities currently contribute to our security cooperation with eight partner
nations; Botswana, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia.
SPP engagements account for over 40 percent of military-to-military engagements each year.
Expansion of the State Partnership Program, particularly in East and North Africa, would
assist in developing stable and enduring relationships with additional strategic partners,
providing a foundation for capacity-building efforts by rotational forces.
Over the past year, U.S. Africa Command increased activities in support of the
National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, including integrating gender training,
which is tailored to partner nation socio-cultural dynamics, into our security sector reform
activities. Liberia has established a goal of 20 percent female representation in its armed
forces, a development that reflects the increasing regional interest in expanding opportunities
for women in the armed forces. We are also working with the Botswana Defence Forces to
assist in its efforts to expand the integration of women into their forces.
PREPARING AND RESPONDING TO CRISIS
U.S. Africa Command stands ready to respond to crises across the continent. Several
incidents in the last year caused the Command to act to ensure the safety and security of
American citizens including the January 2012 rescue of American citizen Jessica Buchanan
and Danish citizen Poul Thisted from captors in Somalia. In November 2012, when rebel
activities in the Central African Republic required the suspension of U.S. Embassy
operations, we assisted the DoS in evacuating U.S. Embassy personnel and American
citizens.
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The dynamic security environments that followed the Arab Awakening have increased
requirements for crisis response capabilities. U.S. Africa Command capabilities to respond to
crisis have matured over the past year, including the establishment of a headquarters
Command Center and the allocation of a Commander’s In-extremis Force in October 2012.
The Commander’s in-Extremis Force is currently based in Colorado, with a rotational element
forward in Europe. Forward basing in Europe would increase the capability of the command
to rapidly respond to incidents on the continent. Our Special Purpose Marine Air Ground
Task Force, which previously focused on supporting security cooperation activities, will be
expanded to allow support to crisis response, further increasing our capabilities in this regard.
HOW CONGRESS CAN HELP
Sequestration and potentially, a year-long extension of the current continuing
resolution, will have a negative impact on the command. The combined effects may force
significant reductions in theater security cooperation activities and joint and combined
exercises, potentially endangering progress in strengthening partner defense capabilities,
gaining access to strategic locations, and supporting U.S. bilateral policy objectives.
Meeting Africa’s many challenges requires the collaboration and support of all agencies of
the U.S. government and the support of Congress. Enactment of full year appropriations for
defense, military construction, DoS, and USAID programs is critical to effective program
planning and mission execution. Because U.S. government efforts are interconnected and
often mutually dependent, fully resourcing one of these pillars without the others compounds
the difficulties of planning and execution, and hinders mission completion.
Many of our programs use a mix of DoS and DoD authorities and funding. For
example, DoS peacekeeping operation authority provides for training our African partner
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nation forces, while DoD section 1206 authority provides for equipping those forces. The
use of dual authorities requires close coordination between departments, and full funding of
the DoS’s security assistance programs is critical to success. We work with our interagency
partners to ensure the resources provided by Congress are appropriately tied to our defense
and foreign policy priorities.
We are keenly aware of the current fiscal environment and support all ongoing DoD
efforts to decrease spending and ensure funds are wisely utilized. Our efforts under the
Campaign to Cut Waste resulted in budget plans which reflect a savings of $1 million in both
monetary and process efficiencies. We have also taken a hard look at our staffing levels,
contracts, and conferences to determine where savings can be realized. We applied a selfimposed
5 percent personnel reduction for both FY13 and FY14 and are on a path to all but
eliminate temporary hires and overhires. But sequestration and a possible year-long extension
of the current continuing resolution will have serious negative consequences for our efforts.
I thank this committee and Congress for its support of our team and our mission.
You have provided key authorities at appropriate times, as in extending through FY14 the
temporary authority to build the counter-terrorism capacities of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,
and countries engaged in AMISOM. Pursuant to this authority, we have worked with the
DoS to plan and execute our support to counter-terrorism capacity-building at a critical time.
We are currently providing logistical equipment to Djiboutian and Kenyan forces
participating in AMISOM. We appreciate this authority and believe it will enable AMISOM
forces to continue their progress against al-Shabaab.
We also appreciate the enhanced train and equip authority under section 1206 of the FY
2006 NDAA, as amended in the FY 2013 NDAA, to permit small scale military
construction among the authorized elements.
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Your annual reauthorization of the temporary, limited authority to use operation and
maintenance funding for military construction in support of contingency operations in our area
of responsibility has permitted us to meet critical operational support needs in a timely fashion,
and we appreciate your recognition of its importance.
The recent volatility in North and West Africa demonstrates the importance of
sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to cover multiple crises
simultaneously. ISR capabilities are required to protect American interests and to assist our
close allies and partners. We appreciate the authorization in the FY 2013 NDAA of an
additional $50 million for ISR in support of our counter-LRA efforts.
We appreciate your continued support for the Combatant Commander Exercise and
Engagement Program. This program is the foundation of our exercises in Africa and funds
strategic lift requirements as well as providing Service Incremental Funds to our
components, ensuring we can provide the forces to work and exercise alongside our African
partners.
Finally, we welcome visits by Congressional Members and their staffs. The Members
and staff who have had the opportunity to travel in Africa gain a deeper appreciation for the
challenges and the many opportunities that are presented in this large and diverse continent.
CONCLUSION
The African continent will continue to present a complex and fluid set of challenges
and opportunities. African nations, the African Union, and regional economic communities are
increasingly demonstrating their willingness to address African security challenges. At U.S.
Africa Command, we will continue to engage with our African partner militaries to strengthen
their skills and capabilities, so they are better able to address shared security concerns and are
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able to contribute to regional stability and security. We also look forward to strengthening our
existing partnerships and developing new partnerships, such as we have with the Libyan
military.
Our contributions to protecting and advancing our national interests would not be
possible without our interagency partners across the government, including the Department of
State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the incredibly dedicated women and men of
the U.S. intelligence community and others. Our team of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines
and Coastguardsmen – and our DoD and interagency civilian teammates – is dedicated to our
mission and their achievements would not be possible without the strong support of their
families.
Thank you for your enduring support to our men and women in uniform and for
your interest in this increasingly important region of the world.

Le Sahel peut attendre

mardi 2 avril 2013

Le Sahel peut attendre

http://lavoiedelepee.blogspot.fr/2013/04/le-sahel-peut-attendre.html

Après deux mois et demi de combats, la mission prescrite par le chef des armées (rétablir la souveraineté de l’Etat malien sur l’ensemble de son territoire et y détruire les organisations terroristes) n’est pas encore accomplie que l’on évoque déjà le repli du gros des forces françaises. 

Mission non encore accomplie

Après avoir stoppé l’offensive djihadiste, reconquis les villes du Nord et détruit le bastion d’AQMI dans le massif de Tigharghar, les forces alliées, et avant tout françaises, ont « planté le drapeau » sur la totalité des villes tenues par les rebelles depuis janvier 2012. La première partie de la mission peut donc être considérée comme atteinte même si avec seulement treize ou quatorze bataillons actifs  français ou africains on ne peut prétendre contrôler étroitement un territoire grand comme deux fois la France.

Sur les cinq organisations qui faisaient face au gouvernement malien, les deux organisations touaregs ont pratiquement disparu, comme Ansar Eddine, ou se sont associées aux forces françaises, comme le MNLA ; AQMI a subi des pertes sévères et semble désorganisé ; le MUJAO et sans doute aussi le groupe de Belmokhtar ont également subi des pertes mais dans des proportions moindres. Ces résultats militaires remarquables ne sont cependant pas décisifs et comportent plusieurs incertitudes.

Si AQMI a subi des coups sévères avec la perte de sa base locale, de plusieurs centaines de combattants et de son principal leader, cette organisation possède encore des ressources et surtout la volonté de combattre la France. L’ex Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (CSPC) n’a accédé au label Al Qaïda à la fin de 2006 qu’avec la promesse de mener le djihad contre la France. Incapable de porter le combat en Europe, AQMI s’est attaqué aux ressortissants français dans le Sahel, y trouvant même une source importante de financement. Avec l’opération Serval, nous lui donnons un véritable front, à la manière des Américains en Irak. Il faut donc s’attendre très probablement à des actions offensives de sa part. Celles-ci peuvent encore avoir lieu au Mali, s’il reste à AQMI des forces dans l’adrar des Ifoghars et s’il est possible de les renforcer ou les renouveler. La surveillance aérienne, la tenue des villes de la région par les forces alliées, le quadrillage accru de l’armée algérienne dans le Sahara et la coopération des Touaregs réduisent néanmoins les possibilités de manœuvre dans ce secteur. Le mode d’action le plus probable pour AQMI consiste donc plutôt dans des opérations contre les Français hors du Mali, au Niger ou en Mauritanie par exemple, avec peut-être l’espoir d’y attirer à nouveau des forces françaises et de multiplier les « Mali » comme Che Guevara voulait multiplier les« Vietnam » pour épuiser les Américains. Par ailleurs, AQMI détient toujours six otages français après le décès probable et encore non clairement expliqué de l’un d’entre eux. Ces otages sont désormais probablement hors du Mali.

La deuxième incertitude concerne les organisations armées des Touaregs. Nous coopérons ouvertement avec le MNLA alors que celui-ci, déclencheur des évènements en janvier 2002 est toujours en guerre contre le gouvernement malien. Ansar Eddine a disparu mais ses combattants n’ont pas tous été éliminés, loin s’en faut. Certains ont rejoint le MNLA ou le nouveau Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad, d’autres poursuivent sans doute le combat, peut-être avec AQMI. Avec cette alliance avec le MNLA, on touche certaines difficultés du « combat couplé ». La coopération des Touaregs est un des clés de la sécurisation du Nord Mali et même de la région mais outre que cela suppose de s’associer avec d’anciens ennemis (beaucoup d’entre eux ont combattu avec Kadhafi), dont des Islamistes radicaux, cette alliance irrite les gouvernements alliés de la région.

Le point le plus préoccupant reste la résistance active du MUJAO qui, au contraire d’AQMI, poursuit un combat asymétrique dans la région de Gao, combat fait de multiples actions d’éclat combinant attaques suicide, infiltrations et tirs de harcèlement. Ces attaques ponctuelles témoignent à la fois de la motivation des membres du mouvement, assez éloignée de l’image de groupe de bandits parfois présentée, de la persistance de leur présence et donc aussi de l’incomplétude de l’opération Serval. Classiquement, le MUJAO mène une campagne de communications appuyée par des actions de combat, là où nous faisons l’inverse. De recrutement local, y compris dans les ethnies Songhaï et Peul, et régional, notamment en Mauritanie, le MUJAO peut prétendre au leadership régional à la place des Algériens d’AQMI. Le MUJAO détient aussi un otage français.

L’action du groupe de Mokhtar Belmokhtar, indépendant d’AQMI depuis la fin 2012 est floue dans ce paysage tactique. Proche du MUJAO, il combat peut-être à ses côtés mais certains témoignages tendent à montrer que non seulement Belmokhtar est toujours vivant mais qu’il se serait réfugié en Algérie. Une organisation qui a été capable d’organiser la prise d’In Aménas est capable de surprendre à tout moment.

Qui pour combattre les djihadistes ?

Face à ces groupes encore très actifs, la force Serval fait encore basculer son centre de gravité sur le fleuve Niger et combine ses actions offensives (l’opération Doro) non plus avec les Tchadiens et les Touaregs comme dans le Nord mais avec l’armée malienne et la MISMA.

Or, ces deux forces sont faibles. Les contingents de la MISMA sont arrivés rapidement sur le territoire malien mais le plus souvent sans équipement et sans un financement suffisant. Le bataillon logistique de la force n’arrivera pas avant la fin du mois d’avril. De fait, l’action de la MISMA se limite au contingent tchadien à Kidal- lui aussi en recherche de financement et rattaché depuis peu à la MISMA- au contrôle de Ménaka par le bataillon nigérien et d’une présence sur les axes routiers du Sud. Quant aux forces armées maliennes (FAM), elles sont désorganisées. Tout au plus peuvent-elles mettre en œuvre huit petits bataillons très mal équipés et mal encadrés. Sans appui français, les FAM sont clairement incapables de sécuriser le fleuve Niger sans même parler de l’Adrar des Ifoghas. La Mission européenne de formation de l'armée malienne, EUTM Mali, a commencé son travail de quinze mois de formation de quatre bataillons de 650 hommes. Avec une Union européenne au moins aussi réticente à financer et armer l’opération EUTM que la CEDEAO avec la MISMA, la reconstitution de l’armée malienne risque de prendre beaucoup de temps.

Quant à la force ONU envisagée pour remplacer la MISMA, son intérêt principal, outre d’élargir le champ des contributeurs, est surtout de transférer aux Nations Unies le financement des opérations. Ce soulagement financier se paierait d’une moindre efficacité tactique, les forces ONU étant incapables de mener des opérations offensives. On voit mal, même avec mandat de chapitre VII et un volume de plus de 11 000 hommes (qu’il reste à réunir), résister longtemps à un adversaire résolu. On peut espérer qu’AQMI se détourne d’un adversaire aussi peu gratifiant mais ce ne sera surement pas le cas du MUJAO. Le secrétaire général des Nations Unies a d’ailleurs admis implicitement l’inefficacité de cette force en demandant la présence d’une force parallèle, qui en l’occurrence ne peut être que française.

Les djihadistes ne sont forts que parce que les Etats sont faibles

Avec un peu de recul sur les évènements, on voit bien avec ces atermoiements que la vraie force des organisations non étatiques armées réside surtout dans la faiblesse des Etats qu’elles affrontent. Ceux-ci ne sont pas faibles parce que leurs armées le sont, c’est l’inverse qui est vrai et les tendances ne sont pas favorables.

Autant AQMI et ses alliés bénéficient des réseaux sombres de la mondialisation (armes légères en abondance, parasitage des trafics en tous genres) sans, pour l’instant, en subir vraiment la corruption, autant les Etats locaux, tous ou presque en situation de désendettement, ont vu leurs moyens d’action publique se réduire. Cela vaut pour les instruments de sécurité mais aussi pour une action sociale qui laisse le champ libre aux organisations privées islamiques. Pire, les financements extérieurs, licites (aide du FMI) ou non (drogue), ont tendance à accroître nettement une corruption endémique qui, par contraste, rend l’offre des organisations islamistes, dure mais honnête, de plus en plus séduisante.  Dans une zone sahélienne sous pression écologique et où la population risque de doubler d’ici à vingt ans, les recruteurs du MUJAO ou de tous les groupes qui sont amenés à naître ou se transformer n’auront aucun mal à trouver des volontaires. Le coup d’état militaire de mars 2012 au Mali doit se voir aussi comme une tentative locale de réaction contre cette dérive générale.  

Pour autant, ces pays du Sahel, Mali compris, disposent de ressources importantes dans leur sous-sol. Leur exploitation, par des compagnies étrangères, peut être la chance de ces pays à condition de parvenir à en dériver une partie notable des revenus dans des Etats solides et des administrations honnêtes.

A court terme, et sans préjuger des évolutions du monde arabe tout proche, l’apaisement des tensions avec les Touaregs est une condition sine qua non de la victoire contre les djihadistes. A long terme, recensements, plan cadastraux, systèmes de retraites, éducation, juges et administrateurs suffisamment bien payés pour être honnêtes, élections transparente, sont les meilleurs instruments pour couper les racines de mouvements que des armées et polices mieux financées grâce pourront mieux affronter en surface grâce à de vraies rentrées fiscales. Dans l’incapacité de créer ce cercle vertueux et sans Etats forts, la guerre contre les djihadistes sera une guerre de Sisyphe.

La France est-elle suffisamment endurante pour mener le combat ?

Le combat initié au Mali, s’inscrit dans un affrontement de longue haleine. Dans des conditions assez proches, il aura fallu trois ans d’engagement au Tchad pour y rétablir provisoirement la sécurité (cliquer sur le libellé Tchad).

A l’époque, la force de la France reposait sur une intégration assez réussie de tous ses moyens d’action sous un commandement unique. La diplomatie ne se focalisait pas sur le repli le plus rapide possible des forces françaises mais sur la manière de réunir les pays de la région dans un même combat, de dissocier le mouvement local de ses sponsors et d’aider à la résolution des problèmes ethniques locaux. Elle participait, avec les militaires qui, de fait, fournissaient la quasi-totalité du personnel engagé, à la restructuration parallèle de l’administration et de l’armée locale. De son côté, un contingent moyen de 2 500 hommes a conduit le combat jusqu’à ce qu’on soit certain que l’armée locale soit capable de prendre le relais et pas avant. Cela se passait quelques années seulement après la guerre d’Algérie, bien plus traumatisante pourtant que le « syndrome » afghan. L’opinion publique était alors beaucoup plus réticente à ce type d’engagement qu’aujourd’hui, où, malgré une chute rapide qui interroge, une majorité de Français soutient l’opération. Autant la vitesse était de mise pour l’intervention initiale, autant la précipitation pour le repli ne l’est pas.

Avec l’intervention du 11 janvier, nous avons retrouvé les vertus de la réactivité qui faisait une partie de notre force à l’époque des interventions nationales françaises. Il reste à retrouver celles de l’endurance, qui en constituait l’autre partie. Non seulement l’engagement au Mali va durer sous des forces diverses mais il faut s’attendre également à une guerre de corsaires sur l’ensemble de la région.

Date: 06.04.2013  Heure: 22:20 GMT

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Ajouté le : 06.04.2013 17:08

Hollande "trompe les français sur une mort de l’émir du Sahara" (AQMI)

Yahya Aboul Humam à Tombouctou en janvier (Aljazeera)

ALAKHBAR (Nouakchott) - Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) a estimé que "le régime de François Hollande a prétendu la mort de l’émir du Sahra pour faire croire à l'opinion publique française qu'il a remporté la guerre au nord Mali et pour désorienter celle-ci des scandales financiers et moraux dans lesquels ce régime s’est trempé", selon un communiqué relayé par Andalus Media sur les réseaux sociaux.

Le mouvement Jihadistes a, dans ce sens, nié la mort annoncée par les médias français de son émir du Sahara dans de récents combats au nord du Mali. Un Emir que "ces médias pensent qu'il s'agissait de Abou Zeid qui serait ensuite remplacé par Yahya Aboul Humam", selon AQMI. 

En effet, a précisé le communiqué, Yahya Aboul Humam, l’actuel émir du Sahara, a remplacé, depuis octobre 2012, Nabil Abou Alghama lequel est décédé dans un accident de la route. Abou Zeid, qu'AQMI n'a pas commenté sa mort confirmée par Paris, était le chef du bataillon "Tarek Ben Ziad" rélévant de l'émirat du Sahara.

AQMI a par ailleurs, menacé que ses combattants "arabes, touaregs, songhaïs, bambaras et haoussa vont apprendre une leçon inoubliable à l’armée française" qui s’est engagée contre les islamistes armée dans le nord du Mali.

La France a déployé au Mali quelques 4000 militaires dans le cadre du plan Serval lancé le 11 janvier contre les groupes islamistes armés qui occupaient le nord du pays.

Paris, qui avait annoncé les retrait, en avril courant, des ses soldats du nord Mali, a proposé, par son des Affaires étrangères, Laurent Fabius, en visite vendredi au Mali, de laisser dans ce pays de façon permanente une "force d'appui" française d'un millier d'hommes pour combattre le terrorisme.

MALI - 

Article publié le : samedi 06 avril 2013 - Dernière modification le : samedi 06 avril 2013

Mali: arrestation de deux Touaregs suspectés d'être proches du MNLA

RFI / S. Borelva / F. Achache

Par RFI

Deux Touaregs ont été arrêtés à Ménaka, dans la région de Gao, par des gendarmes et des policiers maliens. Les deux hommes, un commerçant âgé et un jeune, sont suspectés d'être des proches du MNLA.

Deux touaregs, Abdallah Ag Lele et Issouf Ag Sidi Mohamed, ont été interpelés jeudi 4 avril par des militaires et des gendarmes maliens à Ménaka, selon des sources concordantes. Cette ville du nord du Mali, dans la région de Gao, est contrôlée par des soldats maliens et nigériens depuis le départ des forces françaises.
Une source proche du MNLA (Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad) affirme qu’Abdoulaye Ag Lele, un commerçant âgé, aurait été arrêté sur le marché par une patrouille composée de soldats maliens des troupes du colonel Ag Gamou, accompagnés de gendarmes. Les soldats nigériens, présents sur place, n’auraient pas pris part à l’arrestation.
Ossouf Ag Sidi Mohamed, lui, est un jeune qui travaillait bénévolement dans le même centre de santé que l’ONG Médecins du monde. L’organisation humanitaire confirme son arrestation par des gendarmes et précise que le jeune homme aurait été accusé d’avoir participé à des pillages lorsque le MNLA contrôlait la ville, avant la mi-février.
Du côté des forces maliennes, aucune des sources contactées n’a été en mesure de confirmer officiellement ces arrestations.

TAGS: MALI - MNLA - TOUAREG

Aqmi dément la mort de l’émir du Sahara et indique qu’Abou El Hamam a été établi dans ses fonctions il y a huit mois

Sahara Médias - nord Mali Samedi 6 Avril 2013

inShare

Un communiqué  attribué à Al Qaeda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) a démenti l’information faisant cas de la mort de l’émir du Sahara, et la désignation de Yahya Abou El Hamam comme successeur à lui, indiquant que cette dernière est arrivée immédiatement après le décès « du frère dirigeant » Nabil Abou Alghama suite à un accident de voiture, il y a huit mois. 
Le communiqué, dont Sahara médias a reçu une copie, s’est suffi à dire que Yahya Abou El Hammam dirigeait l’Emirat du grand Sahara, sans faire de commentaire sur les informations qui ont circulé avec force sur la mort du dirigeant Abdel Hamid Abou Zeid. 
Dans le communiqué, il est dit « devant ces contre-vérités françaises, nous rassurons notre umma islamique et annonçons à l’opinion publique internationale le non fondement de la mort de l’émir du Grand Sahara et promettons au président français François Hollande des jours noirs au nord Mali et en Afrique de l’ouest musulmane », selon les termes du communiqué.

Voyant l'Azawad comme une colonie française, Laurent Fabius déclare que le MNLA désarmera

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Créé Le Vendredi 5 Avril 2013 17:16

Écrit Par Toumast Press

En visite au Mali à la vieille de la proclamation de l'indépendance de l'Azawad, Laurent Fabius, le Ministre Français des Affaires Etrangères, vient de déclarer à Bamako que "le moment venu, il faudra que tout groupe, ça vaut pour le MNLA comme pour tout autre groupe armé, accepte d'être cantonné et de renoncer à ses armes"

Le Ministre français, croyant surement que l'Azawad traversait toujours sa sombre période de colonisation française, s'imagine avoir l'autorité et le pouvoir de décider comment et quand il souhaite voir le MNLA désarmé; un MNLA qui n'a d'ailleurs chercher ni son approbation ni celle de la France, avant d'engager le processus de décolonisation de l'Azawad.
Non content d'avoir porté, comme un fardeau, l'armée malienne dans l'Azawad et de lui offrir tout le parapluie nécessaire pour qu'elle commette toutes les exactions imaginables sur les populations civiles Touareg, Arabes et Peulhs, Laurent Fabius va au point de considérer le MNLA au même pied d'égalité que les milices Gandakoy/Gandiso qui sont les seuls présentes dans l'Azawad outre la milice Delta du Colonel-Major Alhaji Ag Gamou qui agit comme une armée dans l'armée malienne.
Cette comparaison en elle-même démontre au MNLA tout le mal que ce représentant du gouvernement français pense de lui dans la mesure où les seules actions des milices Grandakoy/Gandiso consistent à guider l'armée malienne vers les campements nomades pour y commettre les exactions.
A la vielle du premier anniversaire de la proclamation de l'indépendance de l'Azawad, le MNLA se doit de mener une analyse approfondie de ses relations avec la France et de l'impact de la France dans l'Azawad.

La rédaction de Toumast Press.

EZLN - Manifiesto Zapatista Nahualt - Manu Chao

احتفال شعب ازواد بمناسبه اليوم الوطني لدوله ازواد